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Abstract. Transaction privacy is a hard problem on an account-based
blockchain such as Ethereum. While Ben-Sasson et al. presented the Ze-
rocash protocol [BCG+14] as a decentralized anonymous payment (DAP)
scheme standing on top of Bitcoin, no study about the integration of such
DAP on top of a ledger defined in the account model was provided. In
this paper we aim to fill this gap and propose ZETH, an adaptation of
Zerocash that can be deployed on top of Ethereum without making any
change to the base layer. Our study shows that not only ZETH could
be used to transfer Ether, the base currency of Ethereum, but it could
also be used to transfer other types of smart contract-based digital as-
sets. We propose an analysis of ZETH’s privacy promises and argue that
information leakages intrinsic to the use of this protocol are controlled
and well-defined, which makes it a viable solution to support private
transactions in the context of public and permissioned chains.
Keywords: Ethereum, Zerocash, Zcash, privacy, zero-knowledge proofs
1 Introduction
The two cryptocurrencies with the biggest market capitalization are Bitcoin [Nak09]
and Ethereum [But14]. One of the crucial differences between them is the way
they store information. While Bitcoin relies on the UTXO model, which stores
the list of all unspent transaction outputs, Ethereum is account based, that is,
it keeps track of accounts’ balances. Although neither currencies provide strong
privacy properties to their users, Zerocash [BCG+14] practically solved this issue
on Bitcoin-like systems. Unfortunately, integrating Zerocash on Ethereum is not
described in the paper and does not seem to be feasible out of the box.
In this paper we present ZETH – a variation of Zerocash that allows for se-
cure and private payments on Ethereum. We claim that ZETH can easily be
used with any ERC20, or ERC223 token1, and can be used along any Ethereum
client. Moreover, ZETH uses minimal trust assumptions and no asymmetry is
introduced in the system, namely, no trusted or special node or role is required
to satisfy our privacy promises. Finally, we provide a proof of concept imple-
mentation of ZETH2.
1 For discussion about these token standards check https://github.com/ethereum/
eips/issues/20 and https://github.com/ethereum/eips/issues/223.
2 https://github.com/clearmatics/zeth
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1.1 Privacy limitations of Ethereum
The Ethereum protocol provides an extension to Bitcoin by enabling execution
of arbitrary computation on-chain on the so-called Ethereum Virtual Machine
(EVM), which is Turing complete. Ethereum can be seen as a distributed state
machine, where every transaction triggers a state transition. These transitions
modify the underlying state that keeps track of the account balances and con-
tracts’ storage. As a consequence, every transaction done from an account is
publicly recorded on the blockchain and modifies the public state.
Using smart contracts as a way to provide privacy preserving state transitions
appears to be an appealing idea. Unfortunately, such solutions are not perfect
and come with several drawback due to the gas model that was introduced to
bound the computation of each state transition and keep the system running.
In the gas model each operation executed on the EVM uses a number of gas
units and the minimal gas cost of a transaction is 21 000 gas. An Ethereum user
who wants to run a smart contract function has to specify the amount of gas
units to be used for the function execution, along with the price in Wei3 they are
willing to pay per gas unit (gas price). These two values are used to determine
the maximum cost of the transaction the sender is willing to pay. Denote this
upper bound by u Wei. When the transaction is submitted to the system and
gets processed, u Wei are secured at the user’s account. The effective gas usage
of the transaction, denoted e Wei, is computed as the transaction is executed.
The unused gas, namely u− e Wei, is returned to the sender. If the execution of
a smart contract function runs out of gas4, the modifications to the state carried
out during the execution of this function are reverted, the miner5 collects a fee
corresponding to the gas used and the transaction sender does not get any Wei
back.
Crucially, enforcing the payment of gas for every transaction processed on
Ethereum prevents malicious users from saturating the network with dummy
transactions and restrain adversaries from deploying smart contracts represent-
ing never-ending state transitions, e.g. infinite loops.
Since paying for transaction fees directly alters Ethereum accounts, and thus
modifies the public state, everybody can tell the nature of a transaction, what
data it carries and how much gas was paid by the transaction sender. As a con-
sequence, having a smart contract-based private payment solution still requires
users to interact with the contract and pay for its execution. This translates
in information leakage and can disclose a potential relation between the users
interacting with the contract.
Furthermore, implementing a smart contract-based privacy payment solution
can be quite expensive. In fact, since users need to pay for the execution of the
contract, any expensive on-chain computation leads to high amount of gas to be
3 Wei is the base unit (or smallest denomination) of Ether.
4 The amount of gas required to execute the function is higher than the amount of
gas paid by the user.
5 Node that reaches consensus over the Ethereum state and that produces blocks by
executing a set of transactions submitted by network users.
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paid by the smart contracts callers. The expensiveness of privacy on Ethereum
has already been pointed out by the community [Rob18], and should hopefully
improve in the following releases of the platform.
Finally, the gas model inherent to Ethereum implies that several privacy
enhancing techniques, initially described in the context of Bitcoin, cannot be
applied to Ethereum (at least on a Byzantium fork). One of such concept is the
notion of stealth addresses [Tod14]. Using the stealth addresses mechanism to
generate new identities on the network cannot be used on Ethereum because of
the need to pay gas for every transaction. That is, if a user tries to send a trans-
action from a stealth address, the transaction will be considered invalid, because
the balance associated with the address is 0. Consequently, no transactions can
be initiated from it. A naive solution to this issue would be to fund the stealth
address from another, potentially publicly known, address. Unfortunately, such
action may introduce a link between the funded address and the newly generated
stealth address6.
1.2 ZETH protocol
ZETH implements a private payment mechanism by running a mixing smart
contract on which members of the Ethereum network willing to transact privately
deposit their funds in exchange for zethNotes. The notes are stored on the mixer
as commitments and can be privately transferred among users of the network.
Importantly, once the funds enter the mixer it is not necessary to withdraw them
since zethNotes can be used for future payments within the smart contract. This
property essentially increases the security and privacy of the proposed solution.
Intuitively, the longer the funds are circulating in the mixer, the harder it is to
connect them with their previous owners.
In order to provide the same security guarantees as UTXO systems operating
on public data and keep the system sound (funds are bound to an owner and
cannot be double spent), ZETH follows the construction detailed in Zerocash.
First of all, the notes themselves are not transferred between the parties. Rather,
destruction of some N notes belonging to the sender allows for creation of other
M notes possessed and controlled by the recipient.
Secondly, with an overwhelming probability, each note has a distinct and
pseudorandom serial number sn (also called nullifier). When the note is spent
(destroyed), its fixed serial number is revealed on the network to ensure that this
note will not be spent a second time. Moreover, the pseudorandomness of this
number assures that it is infeasible to connect previously published commitments
with the spent notes.
Thirdly, the creation of new notes comes with the publication of a list of
commitments that hide all new notes’ attributes, e.g. the value, public key of
6 Depending on the system, it might be feasible to rely on a trusted third party to
fund the newly generated addresses. Nevertheless, this comes at the cost of more
centralization and requires some degree of coordination which can affect the off-
chain communication complexity.
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the recipient, and nonces %, r. Encryption of these attributes is broadcast. The
ciphertexts are encrypted using the recipients’ encryption keys, such that they
can easily learn hidden attributes necessary to later spend the notes.
Last but not least, correctness of these operations is provided by a suc-
cinct zero-knowledge proof of knowledge (cf. Section 2.3), which assures that
the sender is the rightful owner of the notes, the commitments to the spent
notes were previously published, and the transaction is balanced, i.e. the value
of notes input to the transaction equals the value output. We note here that
some inputs and outputs may be public. An overview of the protocol is provided
in Section 3 and more formal definitions of its security is shown in Appendix B.
Importantly, since the proof verification procedure is deterministic it can be
executed on-chain.
A B C D
Deposit transaction Transfer transaction Withdraw transaction
Notes antecedence Leakage of the amount transferred
Meaningful modification of the state
Fig. 1: ZETH abstraction.
1.3 Security of ZETH
Since each call to the mixer contract leaks the caller who pays the gas for the
smart contract function execution, the list of users of the system is public. That
is, each transfer is accompanied by a modification of the Ethereum state. Espe-
cially, the balance of the caller in decremented by the gas cost of the transaction.
On the other hand, the recipient is fully hidden even when they want to use the
funds by passing them on (i.e. when the recipient effectively becomes the sender)
or withdrawing them from the mixer, cf. Fig. 1. While calling the mixer contract
reveals that a party has funds to transfer and can expose the fact that they were
recipient of a payment in the past; it is not possible to determine the payment
they received. Thus, despite the lack of obfuscation of users, we claim that ZETH
is an appropriate solution to blur the transaction graph, and thus, hide relation-
ships between senders and recipients, transactions’ value, along with the wealth
of each user of the mixing service.
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To make a payment, the sender calls the contract by executing the Mix func-
tion of the mixer smart contract and publishes the serial numbers of the input
zethNotes, the ciphertexts of the new notes, and the transaction’s zero-knowledge
proof of knowledge. The encrypted zethNotes are integrated as a part of the logs
of the transaction and the state of the smart contract is changed since new
commitments are appended and serial numbers are revealed.
We leverage the ability to emit events in a smart contract to implement an
encrypted broadcast used to make sure that the sender and the recipient never
need to communicate. In addition to that, we build on the fact that state tran-
sitions corresponding to mixer contract calls do not reveal the same amount
of information as state transitions triggered by plain Ethereum transactions. In
fact, the state transition encoded by the mixer’s function results in the modifica-
tion of the smart contract state (commitments and serial numbers are appended)
along with some gas being paid by the smart contract caller. Nonetheless, plain
Ethereum transactions (e.g. Alice pays 2 ETH to Bob) modify the public state
which leaks the relationship of the sender and recipient along with the value of
the payment.
In that sense, the use of ZETH changes the topology of the transaction graph.
More precisely, let the graph’s nodes represent Ethereum accounts and its (di-
rected) edges correspond to transactions and messages between them. As shown
in Fig. 2a, each pair of transacting nodes are easy to identify. However, when
transactions go through ZETH, the mixer smart contract serves as an inter-
mediary. Thus, instead of account-to-account edges, the graph is now made of
account-to-mixer or mixer-to-all-accounts (encrypted broadcast) edges that ob-
fuscate the relationship between users of the system, see Fig. 2b.
A B
C
DE
F
Ethereum transaction
Ethereum account
(a) Transaction graph without
ZETH.
A B
C
DE
F
Mixer event/Encrypted broadcast
Mixer
(b) Transaction graph using
ZETH.
Fig. 2: Transaction graph without and with ZETH. Using the mixer changes the
topology of the transaction graph replacing user-to-user edges with user-to-mixer
and mixer-to-all-users ones.
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From the security point of view, it is important to notice that ZETH, us-
ing techniques introduced by Zerocash, allows for an arbitrary denomination
of notes. Although some solutions aim to provide private transactions of stan-
dard/predefined denominations, adding such a constraint has several drawbacks
that can take users away from the recommended behaviors (see Section 4), or
even render the entire system unusable. Furthermore, previous work [Ron18]
have shown that smart contract-based solutions using predefined denominations
could eventually lead to several exploitable data leakages that could, in fine,
undermine the privacy of its users.
1.4 Divergence from Zerocash
As mentioned, Zerocash has initially been designed to work as a fork of the Bit-
coin blockchain. Since Ethereum and Bitcoin differ on many aspects, we needed
to modify the Zerocash protocol in order to reflect the diversions of these two
blockchains.
While most of our construction is based on the protocol described in the
Zerocash paper [BCG+14], our protocol presents weaker privacy guarantees than
the original design. In fact, users of the ZETH mixing service are not obfuscated.
Furthermore, we decided to leverage smart contract events as a way to im-
plement an encrypted broadcast mechanism to exchange the zethNotes between
users of the system. This ability, natively supported by Ethereum, is used to
provide an additional layer of privacy for the system users.
Finally, we decided to implement a single function on the mixer smart con-
tract, that supports both minting and pouring coins. This comes with the draw-
back of requiring a zero-knowledge proof when one makes a deposit into the
mixer (and mint zethNotes), but also comes with the benefit of a more flexible
mixer and a better obfuscation of funds.
1.5 Related work
Before we present our contribution to privacy on Ethereum, it is worth men-
tioning related works presented in the past. A first step integration of Zerocash
and Ethereum was made in 2016 as a joint effort between members of Zcash,
Ethereum Foundation and Cornell University. The resulting code of this project
called babyZoE is available on Github7.
Later, barryWhiteHat proposed a project Miximus8 that was used as a start-
ing point for the first version of our proof of concept before adapting Zcash
Sprout for the second version of the PoC. Finally, a draft study of the inte-
gration of Zerocash on Ethereum has already been written and published on
Github9 a few months ago. This paper formalizes, improves and presents an
implementation of this initial work.
7 https://github.com/zcash-hackworks/babyzoe
8 https://github.com/barryWhiteHat/miximus
9 https://github.com/AntoineRondelet/zerocash-ethereum
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Recently, Meiklejohn et al. [MM18] proposed a ring signature-based tumbler
called Mo¨bius10. This solution, aiming to enhance privacy on Ethereum, leverages
linkable ring signatures coupled with stealth addresses and stealth keys to enable
private transactions while preventing double spending. While the solution seems
to be quite practical in regard of gas consumption and off-chain communication
complexity, it only supports transactions of standard denominations and present
some latency issues. Moreover, since the use of stealth addresses is not compatible
with the current version of Ethereum, deployment of this solution on existing
systems raises some challenges. However, incoming updates of the Ethereum
network could pave the way for an easier use of this approach.
Likewise, a new design for anonymous cryptocurrencies called Quisquis [FMMO18]
has been proposed. This solution relies on the notion of updatable public keys,
and keeps track of users’ wealth using an account structure. The balance of a
given account is kept in an obfuscated, committed form and can be updated us-
ing the homomorphic property of the commitment scheme. Being account based,
Quisquis presents some advantages regarding scalability. Nevertheless, the po-
tentially (very) long list of a user’s updated keys may present a challenge in
term of key management and several issues regarding transactions asynchrony
are still to be solved.
More recently, the AZTEC protocol was published [Wil18]. This efficient pri-
vacy enhancing protocol seating on top of Ethereum uses a form of special pur-
pose zero-knowledge proofs leveraging Boneh-Boyen signatures to create a com-
mitment scheme equipped with efficient range proofs. While AZTEC does not rely
on any zkSNARK, it also comes with the drawback of requiring a trusted setup,
which is expected to be carried out via a multiparty computation ceremony.
Last but not least, Bu¨nz et al. proposed Zether [BAZB19], a private payment
mechanism atop of Ethereum. Similarly to Quisquis, Zether is account-based,
what could potentially ease the interaction with other Ethereum-based smart
contracts. In support of this claim, the authors show several applications of their
mechanism like sealed-bid auctions, payment channels, stake voting and privacy-
preserving proofs of stake. Nevertheless, the design of Zether comes with some
drawbacks, one of them being the cost of a transaction. Furthermore, the size
of a zero-knowledge proof pi in a Zether transfer depends on the size of the
anonymity set, which is preferably as big as possible. Also, since the statement
for pi depends on the sender’s account balance, the account has to be locked to
make sure the proof is acceptable.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notations
Let PPT denote probabilistic polynomial time and let NUPPT denote non-
uniform PPT. Let λ ∈ N be the security parameter, in practice we set e.g. λ =
128. All adversaries are stateful. An adversary and all parties they control are
10 https://github.com/clearmatics/mobius
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denoted by letter A. We write negl or poly to denote a negligible or poly-
nomial function resp. We say that the adversary wins game GAME if they
make GAME return 1. We say that A wins GAME with negligible advantage if
AdvgameA,GAME(λ) = 2 |Pr[GAME = 1]− 1/2| ≤ negl(λ). In this paper we follow the
conventions of [BCG+14] and use sha256 as a hash function inside the Merkle
tree, as a commitment scheme, and as a pseudorandom function.
2.2 Cryptographic primitives
Collision resistant hash function family. Informally speaking, a collision
resistant hash function family H is a collection of functions such that no PPT
algorithm given random h ∈ H can find x and x′, such that h(x) = h(x′) and
x 6= x′ with non-negligible probability. In the real world it is usually assumed
that the hash function family consists of a single function, e.g. sha256. For a
formal definition see, e.g., [Gol01].
Key-private and CCA2-secure encryption scheme. An encryption scheme
E consists of the following three algorithms:
KGen(1λ): given a security parameter as input returns a public key pk and a
secret key sk;
Encpk(m, r): on input m outputs c, a ciphertext that encrypts plaintext m under
public key pk and randomness r;
Decsk(c): given ciphertext c and secret key sk returns plaintext m such that for
any r holds Decsk(Encpk(m, r)) = m.
As usually, we require that the encryption scheme is ciphertext-indistinguishable
(IND-CCA2). That is, for any NUPPT adversary A and sufficiently large λ
Advind-cca2A,IND-CCA2(λ) ≤ negl(λ) ,
for the IND-CCA2 game defined at Fig. 3a. In this game the adversary A is
equipped with oracle access to an oracle O that encrypts messages and decrypts
ciphertexts submitted byA. Finally, the adversary provides two messagesm0 and
m1 and in response gets one of them (picked at random) encrypted in a ciphertext
c. A wins the game if they guess whether c hides m0 or m1. Importantly, A can
query O even after they learned c. However, the oracle answers ⊥ if queried on
the challenge ciphertext c.
In addition to be IND-CCA2-secure, we also require E to be key-private.
Roughly speaking, E is called key-private [BBDP01] if it hides the public key that
was used to generate the ciphertext. Formally we require that for any NUPPT
adversary A and sufficiently large λ
Advik-ccaA,IK-CCA(λ) ≤ negl(λ) ,
for the IK-CCA game defined at Fig. 3b. In this game the adversary A gets access
to two encryption-decryption oracles each of them parameterized with a different
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pair of keys, either (pk0, sk0) or (pk1, sk1). Similarly to the IND-CCA2 game, the
adversary provides message m and in response gets its encryption c under key
pk0 or pk1. A wins the game if they guess whether c was encrypted using pk0 or
pk1. Importantly, A can query their oracles even after they learned c. However,
the oracles answer ⊥ if queried on the challenge ciphertext c.
IND-CCA2
1 : b←$ {0, 1}
2 : (pk, sk)←$KGen(1λ)
3 : (m0,m1)← AOsk,pk
4 : c← Encpk(mb)
5 : b′ ← AOsk,pk(c)
6 : return b = b′
(a) Ciphertext indistinguishable
encryption scheme.
IK-CCA
1 : b←$ {0, 1}
2 : for k ∈ {0, 1}
3 : (pkk, skk)←$KGen(1λ)
4 : endfor
5 : m← AOsk0,pk0 ,Osk1,pk1 (pk0, pk1)
6 : c← Encpkb(m)
7 : b′ ← AOsk0,pk0 ,Osk1,pk1 (pk0, pk1, c)
8 : return b = b′
(b) Key-private encryption
scheme.
Fig. 3: We require that the encryption scheme we use is both IND-CCA2 and
IK-CCA-secure. That is, for any NUPPT adversary A, the probability that A
has non-negligible advantage in one of the games is negligible.
Pseudorandom function family. Informally speaking, a pseudorandom func-
tion family {PRFk : A → B}k∈K is a collection of functions such that for ran-
domly chosen k ∈ K, function PRFk is indistinguishable from a random function
that maps A to B. For a formal definition see, e.g., [Gol01].
Commitment schemes. A commitment scheme Γ is the compound of two
algorithms (Com,Vf) such that:
Comr(m): given message m and randomness r, returns commitment c;
Vf(c,m, r): given commitment c, message m and randomness r, checks whether
c = Comr(m) and accepts iff that is the case.
We say that Γ is statistically binding if no adversary A, even computationally
unbounded, can produce commitment c and two openings (m, r), (m′, r′), such
that c = Comr(m) = Comr′(m
′). Also, Γ is computationally hiding if for every
m,m′, the probability distributions of Comr(m) and Comr′(m′) are computa-
tionally indistinguishable over the choice of randomness r, r′.
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2.3 Brief overview of zkSNARKs
Let R be a relation generator, such that R(1λ) returns a polynomial-time decid-
able binary relation R = {(x,w)}. Here, x is the instance and w is the witness.
We assume that λ is explicitly deductible from the description of R. Let L be
an NP language corresponding to the relation R. Roughly speaking, Ψ is a pub-
licly verifiable zero-knowledge Succint Non-interactive Argument of Knowledge
(zkSNARK) for L if Ψ comports four PPT algorithms KGen,P,V,Sim such that:
CRS generator: KGen is a PPT algorithm that takes security parameter λ
(presented in unary) as input, runs a one time setup routine, and outputs
a common reference string (CRS) crs along with a trapdoor td. The part of
crs used for proving statements is sometimes called proving key and denoted
crsP, and the part necessary for their verification is called verification key
and denoted crsV.
Prover: P is a PPT algorithm that given (crs, x,w), such that (x,w) ∈ R,
outputs an argument pi.
Verifier: V is a PPT algorithm that on input (crs, x, pi) returns either 0 (reject)
or 1 (accept).
Simulator: Sim is a PPT algorithm that on input (crs, td, x) outputs an argu-
ment pi.
We require a proof system Ψ to have the following four properties (see,
e.g., [GM17] for their formal definition):
Completeness: Ψ is complete if an honest verifier accepts a proof made by an
honest prover. That is, the verifier accepts a proof made for (x,w) ∈ R.
Knowledge soundness: Ψ is knowledge-sound if from an acceptable proof pi
for instance x it is feasible for a specialized algorithm called extractor to
extract a witness w such that (x,w) ∈ R. (Note, knowledge soundness implies
soundness.)
Zero knowledge: Ψ is zero-knowledge if for any x ∈ L no adversary can dis-
tinguish a proof made by an honest prover equipped with (crs, x,w) from a
proof made by the simulator equipped with (crs, td, x) but no witness w.
Succinctness: Ψ is succinct if the proof pi is sub-linear to the size of the instance
and witness11.
We note that zkSNARKs described in [GM17,BG18] present an additional
security property that could be desirable, i.e.
Simulation extractability: Ψ is simulation-extractable if from any proof pi
for instance x output by an adversary with access to an oracle producing
simulated proof on given inputs, it is possible for an extractor to extract a
witness w, such that (x,w) ∈ R.
11 By definition the proof can be of polynomial size to the length of the security param-
eter, however modern zkSNARKs usually produce proofs that have constant number
of elements.
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Obviously, simulation extractability is a stronger property than knowledge sound-
ness. This property is crucial for securing transaction non-malleability (cf. Ap-
pendix B.2).
2.3.1 Trusted setup and CRS
As previously stated, zkSNARKs come with the need to generate a common
reference string for the proofs to be computed and verified [GO94]. In the liter-
ature it is usually assumed that the CRS comes from a trusted third party that
provides the string and effectively disappears (does not take any part in the fol-
lowing computations). While a trusted party could be named to run the setup,
such trust assumption is sometimes unacceptable, especially in the context of
public blockchains. Furthermore, if the CRS was produced maliciously it may
compromise the privacy and security of the system breaking zero knowledge and
soundness properties [CGGN17].
Such issues raised a special attention around the use of multi-party compu-
tation (MPC) ceremonies where a set of users run a sophisticated cryptographic
protocol to generate the CRS together. In that setting, the soundness and zero-
knowledge of the system is ensured if at least one participant of the ceremony is
honest [BCG+15,Bow18,BGG17]. More recently, Abdolmaleki et al. [ABLZ17]
and Fuchsbauer [Fuc18] shown how to achieve zero-knowledge if no party in the
MPC protocol is honest.
Recently, Groth et al. [GKM+18] and Maller et al. [MBKM19] proposed a
novel approach for the CRS generation for zkSNARKs that allows to produce a
single master CRS crsmstr for all circuits of given size that can be later securely
specialized into another CRS crsspec for a particular Quadratic Arithmetic Pro-
gram (QAP). In other words, the techniques developed by Groth et al., and
Maller et al. allow to reduce the trust required in the trusted setup. Now, one
only needs to trust that the master CRS was created honestly, what yields se-
curity for all possible crsspec. In our case, one could imagine that we would have
a single crsmstr for all possible mixers and zkSNARK-based protocols, such that
each of them use different crsspec and the security of each of the mixers relies on
the generation of the master CRS.
We note that any kind of non-interactive zero knowledge is impossible in the
so-called standard model and requires some additional assumptions. As an alter-
native to the common reference string model [CF01] one could use the random
oracle model [BR93], as, e.g., in [BBB+18,BCS16], and transform any constant-
round interactive protocol into a non-interactive one using Fiat-Shamir trans-
formation FS [FS86,PS96]. However, it is important to note that no efficiently
computable function can instantiate the random oracle [CGH98,Nie02], the se-
curity proof for FS in [PS96] works for constant-round protocols only, and it is
not certain when the transformation is secure if the random oracle is substituted
by a concrete function.
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3 Overview of the protocol
The following section dives into the specifics of the ZETH protocol. ZETH takes
its roots in the Zerocash protocol [BCG+14], but comes with several modifica-
tions to work on Ethereum. Here, we introduce our protocol and give a short
example of a possible use case. In the considered scenario we focus on two parties
Alice A and Bob B. The parties join ZETH and Alice deposits her money into
the mixer and makes a secure and private payment to some parties, one of which
is Bob. A variable var attributed to a party P is written as P.var or simply var,
if P is clear from the context. For the sake of simplicity we assume that each
party uses only one of their Ethereum accounts in the mixer.
3.1 ZETH setup
In order to make a payment via ZETH, several smart contracts need to be de-
ployed on-chain first.
Addr: (optional) The address registry contract stores the public tuple of the
zethAddresses, i.e. encryption keys and public key used to create notes, of all
peers.
Mxr: The mixer contract handles deposits of funds, private transfers and with-
drawals. The contract contains and keeps track of a Merkle tree of commit-
ments (via MTree), the serial numbers, and calls Vrf (instantiated with the
CRS generated from the setup) to verify the provided proof during a private
transfer of digital assets.
MTree: The Merkle tree contract implements a Merkle tree using sha256 as a
hash function. The Merkle tree is initialized with zero values at its leaves
and is full, i.e., for a tree of depth d it contains 2d+1 − 1 nodes.
Vrf: The verifier contracts contains the CRS generated by the setup and is in
charge of verifying proofs provided by payment senders.
The security of ZETH relies on the security of the zkSNARK proof system Ψ,
which has to be provided with a CRS. As mentioned in Section 2.3.1, we propose
to use multi-party computation to generate the CRS using e.g. [BCG+15,BGG17].
The CRS of the zkSNARK has to be available for various parties of the proto-
col. More precisely, the sender of the payment plays the role of a prover P and
needs the CRS to make an acceptable proof pi. The proof is checked by a smart
contract Vrf, which runs the Ψ’s verifier routine V, thus it has to be provided
with the CRS as well. We emphasize here that the CRS needs to be generated
only once for the whole lifespan of the mixer.
3.2 Joining the mixer
To join ZETH each party P starts with generating their zethAddresses which are
tuples of the form
P.addr := (P.addrpk,P.addrsk) .
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An address P.addr◦ consists of P.a◦ and P.k◦, where P.apk is a public address
derived from a private P.ask, P.kpk is a public encryption key, and P.ksk is a
private decryption key. The key pair (P.kpk,P.ksk) is used to enable the peers
to send each other data privately.
After generating a zethAddress, each party publishes the public tuple P.addrpk
in Addr in order to be able to receive payments from other counterparts. Note,
this step is not absolutely necessary and, if done, should be done only once
for each new joiner. It is also feasible for the parties to send each other their
public addresses addrpk using some other channel of communication (off-chain).
However, if P wants to transact with, say, N other members of the network
they need to send N off-chain messages to inform all of them of their address
P.addrpk. Such a workaround could impede the use of ZETH.
3.3 Mix function
The core of the mixer consists of a Mix function, which provides a method for
secure and private payments between the parties. Mix covers the main function-
alities of Mxr, and provides a unique interface to:
1. make a deposit of public funds to the mixer (and mint zethNotes),
2. proceed with payments between users via the use of Mxr,
3. withdraw funds from Mxr (redeem public funds).
These three functionalities imply a natural division of Mix’s inputs:
– The value vin which specifies the public value that should be added to the
mix. This input is essential for the deposit functionality.
– The value vout which specifies the public value that should be sent back to
the caller. This input is essential for the withdrawal functionality.
– And finally, a set of inputs used to represent transfer of funds in Mxr, which
contains:
• the commitments {cmnewi }Mi=1 to the newly generated zethNotes {znewi }Mi=1,
• a zero-knowledge proof pi that assures that
1. the transaction is balanced, i.e. the sum of the transaction inputs
equals the sum of transaction outputs;
2. if the creation of znew requires spending some old zethNotes zold,
which commitments are stored in a Merkle tree of root rt, then the
user has the right to do so;
• the serial numbers of the spent notes {zoldi }Ni=1, to ensure double-spending
prevention;
• the encryption of the newly created zethNotes, i.e. ciphertexts {ci}Mi=1
that encrypts {znewi }Mi=1; these ciphertexts are crucial for the recipient of
the transfer to be able to spend the notes.
Obviously, privacy of deposits and withdrawals is limited since some pieces
of information are inevitably revealed as the public balances of the depositor
and withdrawer are modified along with Mxr’s balance. We also note here that
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the parties cannot transfer all of their funds to the mixer since they need their
external accounts to pay for the gas necessary to perform ZETH operations.
Nevertheless, no one can tell how the deposited value is spread across the newly
created zethNotes. On the other hand, privacy guarantees in Mxr payments are
strong – nobody can tell which zold-s were spent, what is the value of newly
created znew-s, and who is their recipient.
3.4 Payments explained practically
Here we provide an illustrative example of how Mix works. Now that payer Al-
ice and recipient Bob have generated their zethAddresses (and advertised their
public keys), they can start making payments. As mentioned, we allow Alice to
specify up to M recipients R1, . . . ,RM . Assume Alice wants to pay Ri value
vARi . Note that one or all of these parties could be Alice herself and all the
zethNotes can be zero-valued. Furthermore, commitments of zero-valued zeth-
Notes are indistinguishable from the rest, cf. Section 3.4.1. One should not be
able to tell whether she paid M people M different amounts, or if she paid p
people (p < M) and took back some change, or just whether she split her funds
to herself.
As mentioned, Alice can use two types of funds: her public funds and the
funds she controls on the Mxr contract, i.e. zethNotes zA. Each of them may
be used to create new committed notes cmnew1 , . . . , cm
new
M that will be appended
to the Merkle tree of Mxr. The commitments cmold1 , . . . , cm
old
N already contained
in MTree which Alice controls and decides to use in the transaction are called
spent commitments. The notion of spent commitment is technically imprecise,
but we use it to ease the understanding of the protocol. In fact, the set of
commitments is an ever-growing list, and no one should be able to distinguish
between commitments corresponding to notes that have already been used in
payments (i.e. spent commitments), and commitments which associated notes
have never been used. Only the user knowing the opening of the commitment
can tell whether a commitment was spent or not.
Furthermore, Alice generates a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge pi that
assures she knows the private input aoldsk,i corresponding to a
old
pk,i used to compute
cmold1 , . . . , cm
old
N , and computes zethNotes’ serial numbers sn
old
1 , . . . , sn
old
N . That
assures she is the rightful owner of the funds she tries to spend and no double-
spending occurs. After the proof is computed, Alice calls
Mix(pi, rt, vin, vout, {cmnewi }Mi=1, {sni}Ni=1, {ci}Mi=1) .
The values pi, rt, vin, vout, {cmnewi }Mi=1, {sni}Ni=1, {ci}Mi=1 constitute the data of a
mix transaction txMix. We describe below, the steps Alice needs to follow in
order to transact via Mxr.
3.4.1 Commitment creation
Alice creates M commitments cmnew1 , . . . , cm
new
M to M notes of values (not nec-
essarily distinct) v1, . . . , vM . For each of the newly created commitment Alice
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picks randomness rnewi , s
new
i , ρ
new
i and computes
cmnewi = Comsnewi (vi‖Comrnewi (anewpk,i‖ρnewi )) .
With the commitments created, Alice proceeds to the next step.
3.4.2 Preparation of ciphertexts
Zeth notes z are defined as openings of the commitments cm. More precisely, for
a commitment cmnewi , we define
zi = (a
new
pk,i, vi, ρ
new
i , r
new
i , s
new
i )
and denote by ci the encryption of the note, ci = EncRi.kpk(zi). Note that, if
Alice wants to transfer some notes back to her (e.g. as a change), she encrypts
these notes using her own encryption key A.kpk. Since the encryption scheme is
key-private, no one can tell which key was used to encrypt the message. Thus,
it effectively hides the recipient. Moreover, the ability of the Mxr contract to
broadcast M ciphertexts in a single smart contract call enables Alice to pay up
to M recipients in the same transaction and paves the way for more complex
payment schemes.
3.4.3 Zero-knowledge proof generation
Since commitments cmnewi may be associated to some value and spent in the
future, Alice needs to provide a proof that these commitments are well-formed
and that she had enough funds to create the associated notes. To that end,
Alice picks her N commitments cmold1 , . . . , cm
old
N from MTree and shows in zero-
knowledge that given the primary inputs (the Merkle tree’s root rt, serial num-
bers snold1 , . . . , sn
old
N , commitments cm
new
1 , . . . , cm
new
M , vin, and vout), and the aux-
iliary inputs (input commitments addresses in the Merkle tree cmAddrold1 , . . . ,
cmAddroldN , input notes z
old
1 , . . . , z
old
N , Merkle paths to input commitments mkPath
old
1 ,
. . . ,mkPatholdN , sender secret keys a
old
sk,1, . . . , a
old
sk,N ):
1. For each i ∈ [1..M ],
(a) cmnewi = Comsnewi (v
new
i ‖knewi ),
(b) knewi = Comrnewi (a
new
pk,i‖ρnewi ).
2. For all i ∈ [1..N ], commitment cmoldi
(a) appears in the Merkle tree of root rt at address cmAddroldi and mkPath
old
i
is a valid Merkle path to this commitment,
(b) the commitment used in the payment is correctly formed, i.e.:
– cmoldi = Comsoldi (v
old
i ‖koldi ),
– koldi = Comroldi (a
old
pk,i‖ρoldi ),
– aold,ipk = PRF
addr
aoldsk,i
(0),
– snoldi = PRF
sn
aoldsk,i
(ρoldi ), and
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– the condition voldi · (1 − e) = 0 is satisfied. The boolean value e
is related to an equality check between the given Merkle root rt
and the Merkle root rt′ resulting from the check of the Merkle path
mkPatholdi . More precisely, if v
old
i > 0, then e = 1 to make sure that
the commitment of the associated note is in the Merkle tree, and
that rt = rt′. Nevertheless, if voldi = 0, then e could be 0, which
represents the fact that the equality of the roots is not required12.
In other words, this extra condition enables to support zero-valued
(or dummy) zethNotes.
3. The joinsplit equation below holds, and no value is created by the transac-
tion:
vin +
N∑
i=1
zoldi .v =
M∑
i=1
znewi .v + vout , (1)
where vin, vout are the public input value and public output value resp, and
where zi.v denotes the value of the note zi.
In the rest of this paper, we denote by Rz the NP-relation that consists of all
pairs of primary input x and auxiliary input w that satisfy the constraints above.
Note, that the statement as presented is adapted from Zcash Sprout [HBHW19],
and is a bit different than the one in the original Zerocash paper. However, the
computation of sn and cm follows closely the construct detailed in [BCG+14],
which asks for some additional security mechanisms around the choice and the
use of ρ and r to avoid the creation of malicious notes that cannot be spent13.
Last but not least, the above-mentioned statement does not contain compo-
nents that were added in [BCG+14] to provide transaction non-malleability. To
achieve this property we propose to either use a non-malleable zkSNARK like
[GM17,BG18] along with an additional check used to bind the ciphertexts com-
putation to the rest of the statement, or add the additional elements as specified
in [BCG+14] and [HBHW19, Section 4.15.1] and in the Zcash code base. We use
such an extended statement in Appendix B.2.
3.4.4 Mix function call
After generating the commitments {cmnewi }Mi=1, computing the serial numbers
{snoldi }Ni=1 and the proof pi, and encrypting the notes {ci}Mi=1, Alice is ready to
12 The equality check between two bit strings b1 and b2 can be carried out by a suc-
cession of constraints in the form e · (b1[i]− b2[i]) = 0 for each bit of the bit strings,
where b1[i] (b2[i]) represent the i-th bit of b1 (b2, resp.). Obviously, if e = 1, then the
constrain is satisfied only if the bit strings are equal. On the other hand, for e = 0
the constraint is always satisfied.
13 According to [BCG+14], each serial number is only computed from the first 254 bits
of ρ. As a consequence, it is possible for a malicious payer to create four notes with
ρ0, . . . , ρ3 such that {ρi}3i=0 only differ on the last two bits. In such case, the four
generated notes are valid but share the same serial number sn. Thus, after the first
note of the four is spent, it is impossible to spend the rest. An easy way to solve this
problem is to use all the bits of ρ in the derivation of sn, for instance.
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call
Mxr.Mix(pi, rt, vin, vout, {cmnewi }Mi=1, {sni}Ni=1, {ci}Mi=1) .
The Mxr contract passes all Mix’s inputs, except {ci}Mi=1, to the Vrf contract to
run the zkSNARK verification algorithm Ψ.V. Finally, Mxr accepts iff:
– the given Merkle root rt is valid (i.e. corresponds to one of the roots that
has fingerprinted the Merkle tree of commitments maintained by the smart
contract),
– none of the serial numbers sn ∈ {snoldi }Ni=1 is in the list of serial numbers that
have already been used,
– the zkSNARK verifier Ψ.V accepts the proof pi,
– the sender’s balance is at least vin.
In that case, Mxr appends {snoldi }Ni=1 to the list of serial numbers, adds {cmnewi }Mi=1
as leaves to MTree; and broadcasts {ci}Mi=1. Otherwise, it rejects. One should
note that it is not possible to link the commitments in the Merkle tree with
their associated publicly disclosed serial numbers. This holds since, the serial
numbers are derived from private data only known by the owner of the notes
associated with the commitments. This also ensures that a user appending a
commitment in the tree, as part of a payment to another user, does not know
the serial number in advance and thus, cannot tell when the recipient spends
the received funds. Moreover, given a note z, its associated commitment cm and
the given serial number sn, it is intractable to compute a new serial number for
z different from sn. Thus, disclosing the serial numbers publicly allows parties
to detect and reject attempts of double spending of the same note.
3.4.5 Payment reception
Assume vAB is a value that Alice agrees to sent Bob. To carry out such payment
she computes all necessary inputs to the Mix function and executes it. Although
no more is required from Alice, Bob cannot just accept that Mix function was
executed properly to recognize she fulfilled her obligations. For example, cheat-
ing Alice could transfer less money than vAB. Since the Mxr contract does not
have access to the value Alice and Bob agreed to exchange, it only checks con-
straints to ensure that the system remains sounds, and thus, do not compare
Alice’s committed value v with vAB. To make sure that the payment was done
as supposed, Bob has to perform some additional actions.
First of all, Bob needs to fetch the transferred notes. To that end he observes
the events emitted by Alice’s call to the smart contract and tries to decrypt all
broadcast ciphertexts using his decryption key B.ksk. Say that among the M
ciphertexts M ′ decryptions were successful, resulting in a set of new zethNotes
{zj}M ′j=1 owned and controlled by Bob. (Note that Bob does not need to know
M ′ in advance.) This operation is done by calling a function Receive that scans
Mxr’s events and tries to decrypt all ciphertexts that was posted after Bob’s last
call to the function. Every successful event decryption provides Bob with a new
note that is then stored in his wallet.
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However, even though Bob received the notes, he needs to check that he can
use them and that their values sum up to vAB. To that end, Bob recomputes all
commitments {c˜mnewj }M
′
j=1 given corresponding {zj}M
′
j=1. Then, he checks if:
– all commitments {c˜mnewj }M
′
j=1 are among commitments {cmnewi }Mi=1 just ap-
pended to the Merkle tree in MTree by Alice;
– he is able to compute all the serial numbers associated with commitments
{c˜mnewj }M
′
j=1 and that they have not been published yet;
– the values associated with the commitments {c˜mnewj }M
′
j=1 sum up to vAB;
and accepts the payment if they all hold. Now Bob can follow the same steps
Alice did to use the notes he received and pass them on.
4 Abuse mitigation and best practices
It is important to note that even the best private payment system cannot pro-
vide much privacy if its users, who are supposed to be protected and anonymous,
do not follow some best practices, misuse the system, or do not know its lim-
itations. Even Zcash users’ anonymity can be breached if they behave improp-
erly [KYMM18]. Section 3 and Appendix B give an overview of how the ZETH
protocol works and the security model it follows. This section presents potential
ways to exploit the system to infer valuable information about the ongoing pay-
ments showing the limits of the security model we use and presents a few best
practices to mitigate attack vectors as much as possible.
Keep the funds in the mixer as long as possible. As explained in Sec-
tion 1.2, the state maintained by the Ethereum blockchain leaks some informa-
tion about users of the system. As a consequence, the longer users make payments
via the mixer, without transfers from/to Ethereum accounts, the better. This
leaks less data to passive attackers who monitor the account balances of users
of the mixing service.
Beware of almost empty MTree. As one might have noticed in Section 3,
if the Merkle tree of commitments MTree is almost empty when Alice and Bob
want to make a secure payment, then their privacy is at risk as they could be
identified as the sender and recipient of the payment. Assume a scenario when
there is almost no commitments in MTree, then some funds are added by Alice
and some funds are withdrawn by Bob. In some circumstances, an adversary
who observes the contract can guess that Alice made payment to Bob and the
payment was at least of value withdrawn by the latter. Thus, it is important to
avoid withdrawals until the number of non-zero leaves (commitments appended)
of MTree is of reasonable size.
On the other hand, a large MTree cannot be considered absolutely safe. Since
the adversary can easily add many MTree entries by doing transactions between
accounts controlled by themselves, Alice may be tricked to think MTree is big
enough, while in fact all entries but Alice’s are controlled by a single eavesdrop-
ping party.
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Small user anonymity set. Similar situation occurs when there is very few
active parties using the Mxr contract. If Alice and Bob are the only parties using
Mxr, then an observant adversary can assume that each payment made by Alice
has Bob as a recipient. Furthermore, if Bob withdraws funds from the contract
despite he has not made any deposit, the adversary could conclude that the
funds were transferred by Alice.
We suppose here that we have a public registry of users of the Mxr contract
(as e.g. Addr). It is important to understand that even though a large set of
users of Mxr often comes with the belief of stronger privacy guarantees this is
not always the case. In fact, similarly to the case of a small set of commitments
in MTree, an adversary could easily register a lot of parties in the Addr contract
by paying only a small fee. In that case, Alice could have the impression that
the registry contains a lot of entries, while almost all of them are controlled by a
single entity, leading to a system with insufficient privacy guarantees [Dou02]14.
Split funds in the mixer. It is a good practice for users to make payments
to themselves to spread their wealth across a set of commitments and obfuscate
their balance. Note that these payments may be dummy payments of value 0,
which are indistinguishable from non-zero payments and introduce the necessary
noise in the system. However, such operations come at the cost of paying for gas
for the execution of the Mix function.
Use the most recent Merkle root to enhance the mixing. As the set of
all commitments is stored in a Merkle tree, it is fingerprinted by the tree’s root.
Hence, whenever a new commitment is appended as a leaf of the tree, the value
of the root changes. Importantly, if a user uses an older version of the Merkle tree
to spend their funds, the associated proof is still valid. However, such behaviour
is not advised. As the tree is ever-growing, the number of non-empty leaves at
time t0, denoted by nt0 , is smaller or equal to this number at time t1, denoted
by nt1 , for t0 < t1. Assume a transfer is made at time t1 using the root of the
tree from t0. Then, even though the tree contains nt1 leaves an adversary can
tell that the commitments used in the transaction are among those that were
appended to the tree before t0 what limits anonymity.
If decryption of zeth notes fails. Assume that Alice and Bob have a contrac-
tual agreement and that Alice owes k ETH to Bob in exchange for some goods.
Note that when Alice transfers funds to Bob she is supposed to encrypt a num-
ber of zethNotes of agreed values using Bob’s encryption key. Moreover, Bob
can pass the funds on only if he decrypts them. If Alice wishes to trick Bob,
she could decide to encrypt her zethNote using her own encryption key. That
way, instead of making a payment to Bob, she makes a payment to herself and
14 We note here that the cost of such an attack is very low. Adding an entry to the
on-chain address registry Addr is very cheap and basically consists in paying the gas
required to add an entry to the storage of Addr, along with the intrinsic gas cost of
an Ethereum transaction.
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waits for Bob to send her goods. Nevertheless, this issue could be solved by re-
quiring Bob to withhold sending Alice’s goods until he manages to decrypt the
notes that match with the expected value for the goods15. Unfortunately, now
Bob can behave maliciously and accept the payment without sending the goods.
This problem, referred to as contingent payment is out of the scope of this paper.
In case Bob receives a payment that is not correct or just fails to receive
any payment from Alice, we propose to use a dispute mechanism coupled with
a reputation system (again, out of scope of this paper) which could be a way to
stop malicious senders. In such scenario, Bob could make a zero-knowledge proof
that no ciphertext broadcast by Mxr matched the contract he had with Alice. In
that case, Alice’s reputation on the system could be severely damaged and may
result in fewer users willing to transact with her.
Mxr users distinguishability. An important drawback of ZETH comes from
the fact that users of Mxr are distinguishable. That is, it is feasible for an ad-
versary to tell the difference between users using the mixer and those who do
not, i.e. who have never used Addr or called the mixing contract. Hence, it is
important to be aware that a party registering an address to Addr discloses that
they perform transactions via ZETH or help other parties to do that.
However, the recipient of a ZETH payment can remain unrecognized as a
user of the system as long as they transmitted their addrpk to the sender using
off-chain communication; and as long as they do not manipulate the funds they
control on the mixer. A party is identified as a user of ZETH as soon as they make
a call to the mixer or any other ZETH smart contract. Leaking such information
may be benign in some cases, but sometimes it may put the user at risk, e.g. if
the user lives in a country ruled by an authoritarian regime that forbids using
privacy-enhancing technologies.
Failures and backup. The design of ZETH presents some desirable properties
related to hardware failure or loss of the zethNotes. In fact, provided that a
user has a backup of their zethAddresses, they can easily retrieve the set of
their zethNotes by scanning the chain in search for events emitted by the mixer
contract. As described earlier, Mxr broadcast encrypted zethNotes, thus a user
who downloads and tries to decrypt all emitted ciphertexts, eventually retrieves
the set of all zethNotes they should control.
Forward secrecy. Using a single zethAddress for all incoming payments puts
a user at risk. An adversary who retrieves user’s decrypting key ksk at time
t could expose all communications that happened prior to this time and thus
violate forward secrecy. A way to mitigate this, would be to renew zethAddresses
periodically to ensure that zethNotes are encrypted under different encryption
keys over time.
15 Basically, Bob withholds sending Alice’s goods until he successfully ran the Receive
function.
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The threat of a quantum attacker. Using encrypted broadcast implies stor-
ing ciphertexts on a publicly available chain. A direct consequence is that they
are subject to quantum attacks, which violates the privacy promises of the proto-
col, unless the ciphertexts are encrypted using post-quantum secure encryption
scheme.
5 ZETH for permissioned chains
In this section we detail a few properties of ZETH regarding its use in consortium
and permissioned chains. We note that threat models between permissioned and
public chains differ in many ways. For example, permissioned networks offer
control over the parties that want to join, can efficiently counter Sybil attacks
and if parties behave maliciously, they can be excluded from the chain and never
allowed to join again.
CRS generation. As mentioned in Section 2.3, a trusted setup needs to be
carried out once for the protocol to work. While delegating the generation of the
CRS to a trusted party inside or outside the system could be acceptable in some
circumstances, such trust assumptions are unacceptable in most cases.
In order to limit the trust put in the party in charge of generating the CRS,
multi-party protocols could be considered. However, it is still required for the
users of the system to believe that among all the parties that are involved in the
CRS generation at least one is honest. In the other case, colluding parties could
prove false statements and, effectively, create money “out of thin air”.
By its very nature a public blockchain project is opened to everyone. As a
consequence, the set of potential users of the system can theoretically contain all
humans living on Earth. Although often all system users are welcomed to join
multi-party CRS generation, practice shows that it is not usually the case. One
example of this observation is the recent Sapling MPC implemented by Zcash.
Despite the fact that the procedure was opened to everyone, only around 90
people16 joined the MPC ceremony in order to generate the CRS. Furthermore,
in a public blockchain there is no way of telling how many of these 90 people
were in fact different, who they represent, or what are their incentives. That is,
a dishonest user could simply generate and register multiple identities hoping
for gaining unfair impact on the final shape of the generated CRS.
Nevertheless, in permissioned blockchains the situation is quite different and
it is justified to assume that all the network members are known. Moreover, some
requirements can be enforced to ensure that all parties involved in the network
participate in the distributed trusted setup generation. For example, access to
the network may only be granted to the parties who have participated in the
CRS generation.
Furthermore, one can assume that the parties also do not want to pass on
the CRS generation. This is since members of consortium chains are often actors
16 The list can be found on https://github.com/zcash-hackworks/sapling-mpc/
wiki.
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that practice and evolve in very similar economic sectors. Hence, every member
has an incentive to acquire information about the activity of the others. In fact,
being able to gather intelligence about other members or being able to violate
the soundness of the system could lead to a competitive advantage. Thus, it is
reasonable to assume that all members of the network are incentivized to take
part in the generation of the CRS, rather than just use the trusted setup provided
by their competitors. As a consequence, it is justified to remove the threat of
full collusion regarding the generation of the CRS from the threat model.
Privacy leakages. As mentioned, Ethereum addresses of parties using the
mixer contract are revealed since they all need to pay gas to call the mixer’s
function. While such leakage might be problematic in public chains, this is not
necessarily an issue in permissioned networks. In fact, it could be expected that
the zethAddress of each network member is added to Addr as part of the pemis-
sioning mechanism for instance.
A note on Sybil attacks and distinguishability. As noted in Section 4, a
small number of registered players in Addr may allow an adversary to efficiently
connect senders and recipients of payments. Furthermore, an adversary can fool
honest parties to believe that there are enough parties in the mixer to provide
necessary security, while that is not the case, cf. Section 4. Fortunately, in a
permissioned blockchain Sybil attacks can efficiently be prevented, since joining
the chain is not open to everyone and one can assume that each party therein
is somehow verified (e.g. when the system remains compliant with the Know
Your Customer (KYC) requirements). This property allows for more precise
measurements of privacy level of the mixer. For example, given access to Addr one
can credibly estimate the number of all involved parties and judge for themselves
whether this number is satisfiable for them or not.
6 Implementation
In this section we describe the proposed proof of concept implementation of
ZETH17. Our implementation relies on the libsnark18 library and makes use of
the precompiled contracts for the elliptic curve operations on bn256 introduced
in Ethereum after the Byzantium hardfork. In order to implement ZETH, we
follow the separation of concerns [Dij82] approach. Hence, the proposed archi-
tecture is modular and comports different components, each of which has its
own role. The components communicate with each other using Remote Proce-
dure Calls (RPC), which are implemented using the gRPC framework19 along
with Protocol Buffers20. The overall architecture of the proof of concept is
presented in Fig. 4.
17 https://github.com/clearmatics/zeth
18 https://github.com/scipr-lab/libsnark
19 https://grpc.io/
20 https://developers.google.com/protocol-buffers/
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6.1 Overall architecture
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- GetVerificationKey() returns 
VerificationKey;
- GetProof(Input) returns Proof;
Fig. 4: An overview of the architecture and flow of function calls for the current
proof of concept.
6.1.1 Proof generator (PG)
The core component of ZETH is Proof Generator (PG). This component holds a
Rank 1 Constraint System (R1CS) representation for the circuit corresponding
to relation Rz21, cf. Section 3.4.3, and presents an RPC interface to receive and
answer requests from Proof Consumers (PC).
R1CS is an NP-complete relation of tuples ((A,B,C,v),w), where A,B,C
are matrices and v,w are vectors over some finite field F. The relation is satis-
fied iff A(1,v,w) ◦B(1,v,w) = C(1,v,w). A,B,C represent the circuit gates
(left and right inputs, and an output), v and w are public and private inputs
respectively [BGT+18,GKV+18]. This representation was prepared using the
libsnark library.
21 The circuit was taken from the Zcash code base (https://github.com/zcash/
zcash/tree/master/src/zcash/circuit) and adapted to meet our needs.
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In our PoC starting PG triggers the generation of a CRS for the zkSNARK
for Rz and results in proving and verification keys, denoted by crsP, crsV resp.
The keys are stored on disk and the server starts waiting for incoming requests.
As of now, the proposed RPC interface is limited to only two types of calls,
i.e GetVerificationKey and GetProof. The first call reads the verification key crsV
and sends it over to the caller. The second, GetProof, takes an input provided by
PC, i.e. an assignment to the witness variables, generates the proof, and returns
it to the caller.
To ease the use of ZETH, PG is run in a Docker container22 listening on a given
port. This container could be launched on a user’s machine in the background
as a daemon process waiting to receive requests to generate proofs. Since proof
generation is computationally expensive, PG is written in C++ for the sake of
efficiency.
6.1.2 Proof consumer (PC)
The proof consumer is a module responsible for requesting proofs to PG. This
component gets the instance and its witness as input. It does not hold an R1CS
representation for the statement or carry out any operation to generate the
proofs (contrary to the proof generator). In fact, the PC does not even need to
know the CRS required to prepare or verify the proof.
Since no expensive computation is expected to be carried out on PC, it is
reasonable to use any high-level programming language without worrying too
much about the performance overhead that can be introduced. In its current
state, the proof of concept does not provide any command line interface (CLI) nor
front-end to ease payments via Mxr and improve user experience. Development
of applications to ease user experience is left as further work and improvements.
6.1.3 Separate CRS generator
It is important to highlight that centralizing the generation of the CRS in the
component in charge of generating proofs comes with very high trust assump-
tions and could translate in a violation of the soundness of the system. More
precisely, if PG generates the CRS, it knows the CRS’s trapdoor what allows the
production of fake, yet acceptable, proofs by running the simulator algorithm of
the underlying zkSNARK. We emphasize here that the secure CRS generation
is out of the scope of the presented proof of concept.
A natural improvement of our proof of concept would be to introduce a sep-
arate CRS Generator (CG) component in charge of generating and publishing
the CRS. CG could either be a single trusted component or one of many com-
ponents involved in an MPC ceremony that generates the CRS. Choosing the
method to generate the CRS depends on the trust assumptions of the system.
We recommend using an MPC ceremony.
Adding the CRS generator as a new component in the architecture comes
with a few changes. First of all, new RPC interfaces need to be introduced in
22 https://www.docker.com/
ZETH: On Integrating Zerocash on Ethereum 25
order to make other components able to fetch the proving and verification keys
from CG. The interfaces are required, since PG needs to have access to crsP to
be able to generate a proof. Likewise, the Vrf smart contract needs to have
access to the verification key crsV to be able to run the verification routine of
the underlying zkSNARK. Moreover, it should also be possible to require CG to
publish the generated CRS (crsP, crsV) to make it easily accessible to users of
the system. While the CRS could be published on a web-page, it is necessary to
keep in mind that the server storing and serving the CRS needs to be assumed
non-malicious and always online, otherwise it could be possible to change the
CRS and advertise a malicious one. To that end, keeping the generated CRS
on-chain as part of a smart contract’s storage is appealing. However, the size of
the proving key is often too big for this solution to be considered. We let the
implementation details of CG, along with the design changes it implies, as further
work to the interested reader.
6.1.4 The mixer smart contract
While both PG and PC run on a user’s machine, Mxr is a smart contract, and thus
gets compiled down to an EVM bytecode and executed on-chain. This smart
contract maintains the Merkle tree of commitments, the list of serial numbers
that have been revealed as payments were made, and is in charge of calling
the zkSNARK verification algorithm along with some additional checks to keep
the system sound. We note that the zkSNARK used in the system is publicly
verifiable and the verification is efficient enough to be carried out on-chain. The
core function of Mxr is the Mix function described on Fig. 5.
6.1.5 Paying with ZETH – flow of function calls
Given the main components of the proof of concept, this section describes the
flow of function calls during a ZETH payment. The section follows and explains
the steps described on Fig. 4.
Step 0: A payment is triggered by a user of the system, who also specifies the
recipient(s) and value(s). The selection of the notes to spend can either be
detailed by the user, or managed by software.
Steps 1 and 2: (1) Randomness is generated for the newly created zethNotes
which are then encrypted using the recipients’ encryption keys. (2) An RPC
call is made to PG to generate a proof. The call passes a witness for the
instance being proven.
Steps 3 to 5: (3) The RPC call is executed and (4) the proof is generated from
the given inputs. (5) The obtained proof is sent back to the client.
Steps 6 and 7: (6) The proof is received and (7) used as an argument, along
with the encrypted zethNotes, to the Mix function.
Steps 8 to 11: (8) Mix is executed and the on-chain verification of the zk-
SNARK proof is done via the Vrf contract. (9 - 10) The contract leverages
the precompiled contracts for elliptic curve operations on bn256 written in
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Mxr.Mix(pi, rt, vin, vout, {cmnewi }Mi=1, {sni}Ni=1, {ci}Mi=1)
1 : valid proof ← false
2 : if (¬MerkleRootList.Contain(rt)) then abort endif
3 : for i ∈ [0..N ] do
4 : if (SerialNumberList.Contain(sni)) then abort
5 : else SerialNumberList.Insert(sni) endif
6 : endfor
7 : valid proof ← Vrf.Vf(pi, rt, vin, vout, {cmnewi }Mi=1, {sni}Ni=1)
8 : if (¬valid proof) then abort endif
9 : if (¬IsEqual(vin,EthTxObj.value)) then abort endif
10 : for i ∈ [0..M ] do
11 : MerkleTree.InsertLeaf(cmnewi )
12 : endfor
13 : if (vout > 0) then SendValue(vout,EthTxObj.sender) endif
14 : rt′ ← MerkleTree.GetMerkleRoot()
15 : MerkleRootList.Insert(rt′)
16 : for i ∈ [0..M ] do
17 : BroadcastCiphertext(ci)
18 : endfor
19 : BroadcastMerkleRoot(rt′)/ (optional): Broadcast the new Merkle root
20 : return
Fig. 5: Pseudocode of the Mix function of Mxr. Here, EthTxObj denotes the
Ethereum transaction object. It is worth remembering that the execution of
a smart contract function is atomic. Thus, if an abort instruction is reached, all
the modifications made to the state in the previous instructions are rolled back.
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the miner’s Ethereum client. (11) Vrf contract returns true if the provided
proof is accepted and false if that is not the case.
Step 12: The events triggered by the execution of Mix are emitted.
Step 13: The Receive function runs in the background on the client. It listens
and tries to decrypt all emitted ciphertexts. If a decryption succeeds, a pay-
ment is received and the user interface is updated to reflect the reception of
a payment.
6.2 Remarks
6.2.1 Deploying PG and PC
The architecture described above uses different components communicating via
RPC calls. Every component could easily be deployed on a separate machine
without affecting the way ZETH works. However, the threat model associated
with the presented proof of concept only considers the case where the proof gen-
erator and proof consumer run on trusted machines that are physically accessible,
owned and controlled by the user, and that communicate via a secure channel. In
the proposed PoC, the machine running PG is represented by a Docker container,
whereas PC runs directly on the user’s machine (i.e. not in a container). Both
processes communicate using a virtual loopback interface. As a consequence, the
traffic generated by the communicating processes PG and PC does not leave the
user’s machine. Hence why we consider this communication channel to be secure.
Deploying each component on a different and potentially untrusted machine
is facilitated by the modularity of the proposed architecture, and can easily be
done with very few modifications to the code. Nevertheless, we emphasize that
the threat model needs to be modified accordingly depending on where each
component runs, who owns and controls the pieces of hardware running PG and
PC, how data (keys, zethNotes) are managed and accessed, and so forth. It is
highly probable that additional integrity and security checks would need to be
implemented to keep the system secure.
6.2.2 Changing the programming languages
In the proposed proof of concept PG and PC communicate via RPC calls and are
written in different programming languages. Since PG runs expensive operations
related to the CRS generation and proof computation it is advised to implement
it in a low level and efficient programming language. In the current PoC PG uses
libsnark and is implemented in C++. Alternatively, one could implement PG in
Rust using Bellman23, for instance.
Making changes in one of the modules is completely transparent for the
others. That is, changes in PG do not impact PC in any way, provided the API
is not changed and the format of requests and responses is the same, and vice
versa. Components are loosely coupled what makes the entire architecture more
flexible.
23 https://github.com/zkcrypto/bellman
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6.2.3 Using ZETH with ERC20/ERC223 tokens
The pseudocode of the Mix function, cf. Fig. 5, is compatible to work with ERC20
or ERC223 tokens. In fact, SendValue is a pseudocode function that represents
the action of sending value from a contract to a recipient. (Here, the recipient
of the funds is the sender of the transaction). In order to use the mixer with a
given digital asset, one needs to use the SendValue function bound to that asset.
Namely, if Ether is used, the solidity code for SendValue is msg.sender.transfer
(amount). However, if Mxr is used to transfer ERC20 tokens, the solidity code for
SendValue is erc20TokenInstance.transfer(msg.sender, amount).
In addition to properly instantiate SendValue, a few other minor changes
need to be introduced in Mxr. In fact, the contract needs to be given the address
of the ERC20 token to use and the right allowances need to be set for Mxr to be
able to modify user balances on the token contract on their behalf.
6.2.4 Ethereum events to push data to consumers
In general, retrieving data from a database may cause data leakage and privacy
issues. The sole fact that some user is querying a particular database may reveal
private information. For example, in the case presented in this paper, a user
who constantly queries the mixer contract could be identified as a receiver of
a payment who wants to fetch their new notes. In particular, if an adversary
observing the mixer notices that a payment made by some party P is followed
by queries to Mxr by another party P ′, they may conclude that the payment was
sent from P to P ′.
In order to prevent any data leakage associated with users’ queries, we lever-
age Ethereum events to log important data and push ZETH-related pieces of
information directly to each subscriber. This enables Mxr users to be aware of
the current state of the contract without requiring them to query the blockchain
and obfuscates the link between a sender and their recipients.
6.2.5 Multiple payments in a single transaction
The ability to emit multiple events in a single smart contract call makes it
possible to perform multiple payments within a single transaction. In fact, Alice
can pay both Bob and some other party Charlie by generating a zethNote for
each of them, and then encrypting each note with their encryption keys. The call
to Mix broadcasts both ciphertexts using Ethereum events. The recipients can
retrieve their zethNotes by decrypting them. The upper bound for the number
of parties that can be paid in a single transaction is given by the parameter M
in the joinsplit equation (cf. Eq. (1)).
The possibility to do multiple payments in a single transaction leads to some
hope regarding scalability of the proposed protocol as it could be used to limit
the number of transactions submitted to the system. Unfortunately, increasing
the number of input notes N significantly affects the performance of the sys-
tem as checking multiple Merkle path efficiently remains a major bottleneck.
Moreover, increasing M while keeping N small is not a viable solution. In fact,
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a large number of output notes M could lead to plethora of notes of negligible
value. Making any payment with such scattered funds would require multiple
transactions to gather them together. Further work is required in this direction.
6.2.6 Gas cost
The overall gas cost of a Mix call is dominated by the gas cost of a zkSNARK
proof pi verification. (For the details of the underlying zkSNARK Ψ used in the
PoC check [BCTV13, Fig. 10, App. B].) We express the verification cost as a func-
tion of the gas cost of key operations such as point addition (ECADD GAS), scalar
multiplication (ECMUL GAS) and pairings equality checks (PAIRING BASE GAS
for each equality to check and additionally PAIRING PER POINT GAS for each
pairing to compute24.) on bn256.
Let x = (x1, . . . , xn) denote the instance and {vkIC,i}ni=0, vkA, vkB , vkC , vkγ , vk2βγ
represent the CRS elements all belonging to group G1 or G2; proof pi consists of 8
elements: piA, pi
′
A, pi
′
B , piC , pi
′
C , piK , piH ∈ G1 and piB ∈ G2. Similarly to [BCTV13]
we define groups G1,G2,GT of size exponential to the security parameter λ and
a bilinear pairing e : G1 × G2 → GT . We denote group’s Gi generator by gi
and use additive notation for G1 and G2, and multiplicative notation for GT .
Operations performed by a verifier contract Vrf follows Ψ.V and come with the
costs:
1. Compute the linear combination
vkx ← vkIC,0 +
n∑
i=1
xi · vkIC,i ∈ G1 ,
gas cost: n · (ECMUL GAS + ECADD GAS) + ECADD GAS.
2. Check the validity of knowledge commitments:
e(piA, vkA) = e(pi
′
A, g2) ,
e(vkB , piB) = e(pi
′
B , g2) ,
e(piC , vkC) = e(pi
′
C , g2) ,
gas cost: 3 · (PAIRING BASE GAS + 2 · PAIRING PER POINT GAS).
3. Check that the same coefficients were used:
e(piK , vkγ) = e(vkx + piA + piC , vk
2
βγ) · e(vk1βγ , piB) ,
gas cost: PAIRING BASE GAS+3·PAIRING PER POINT GAS+2·ECADD GAS.
4. Check QAP divisibility:
e(vkx + piA, piB) = e(piH , vkZ) · e(piC , g2) ,
gas cost: PAIRING BASE GAS+3·PAIRING PER POINT GAS+ECADD GAS.
24 Note that the gas cost of the group operation in the target group of the bilinear
pairing is included in PAIRING PER POINT GAS along with the computation of the
bilinear pairing itself. Thus, it is not necessary to account for it separately in the
gas cost computation.
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Using the Ethereum parameters25 and the fee schedule described in the
Ethereum Yellow Paper [Woo18], we can estimate the gas cost of an on-chain
proof verification. The overall gas cost associated with the verification of [BCTV13]
zkSNARK lies below 2 million gas when the joinsplit equation (cf. Eq. (1)) has
2 private inputs and 2 private outputs. It is worth mentioning that this cost is
expected to diminish tremendously if EIP110826 gets accepted and implemented.
Importantly, modifying the number of inputs and outputs supported by the join-
split equation increases the size of the circuit which affects the proving time. In
addition, a larger instance increases the verification time, the verification cost,
and the number of modifications made in the Ethereum storage at each function
call. While verifying the zkSNARK proof constitutes the main gas cost of the
Mix function, it is important to remember that storing value on Ethereum is
expensive as well. As a consequence, deploying a mixer contract maintaining a
very deep Merkle tree will not come for free, as the entire set of leaves27 needs
to be kept in the storage of Mxr, along with all the serial numbers. Keeping this
is mind is essential when modify the parameters of the system.
6.2.7 Further improvements
As explained above, the piece of software implemented to test ZETH on Ethereum
is a proof of concept resulting from the adaptation of existing projects. We em-
phasize that tremendous work is needed to have an acceptable proving time and
a secure implementation that could be considered as a production-ready piece of
software. The Zcash team has done astounding work the past couple years and
their Sapling network upgrade has led to a dramatic reduction of the complexity
of their circuit, leading to significant optimizations and reduction in execution
time. Similar work could be carried out to improve ZETH, but this is left as a
future work.
Furthermore, the current RPC interface can easily be extended to meet users’
needs. The use of gRPC and of Protocol Buffers makes it trivial to define new
services and extend existing ones. Extending the RPC interface and facilitating
user experience is out of the scope of this work and let as a future work to the
interested reader.
Last but not least, further work around the use of a multi-party computation
ceremony is required to lessen trust assumptions around the generation of the
CRS.
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A Beyond ETH 1.0
In the current version of Ethereum, Externally Owned Accounts (EOA) are se-
cured via the use of ECDSA signature scheme [oST13] and a nonce mechanism.
However, several proposals have been made to abstract these security mecha-
nisms and allow for alternative protection systems. The end goal is to enable
users of the network to define their own security model.
To do so, owners of EOA could provide their own transactions validation
process, defining their own signature scheme and its verification code. That is,
a transaction initiated by user’s address A is signed by A’s signature algorithm
and verified using A’s verification code. While the signature algorithm and the
corresponding verification code can be picked arbitrarily by the owner of the
account, the protocol should only allows verification procedures that could be
executed succinctly enough to protect the system liveness. To that end, an upper
bound of 50 000 gas for the verification function has been initially proposed
in [But15] which has been increased to 200 000 in further proposals [But18c]
or [But18b].
Abstracting out the verification process of each transaction opens new possi-
bilities for mixers (cf. [But18a] for the case of ring signature mixers). If we could
define a verification function to verify a zkSNARK proof efficiently enough, we
could enhance the protocol to enable calls to the Mix function from newly gen-
erated addresses, possibly stealth address with no funds, while ensuring that the
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miner would receive fees directly from the funds held on the mixer. For example
in case of ZETH, if arbitrary verification codes were supported, a party P will-
ing to execute Mxr.Mix could first create a stealth address P ′, and then submit
a transaction tx to Mxr from P ′. Since nobody should be able to connect P and
P ′, the anonymity of P would be protected28.
Nevertheless, the design of account abstraction is still under discussion and
several trade-offs need to be taken into consideration to allow for more abstrac-
tion while keeping the system sound and secure [But17].
B Security guarantees
The security guarantees of our scheme are inherited directly from the building
blocks we use, especially Zerocash. The Zerocash authors described three nec-
essary conditions for a payment system DAP to be private and secure. That
is,
1. ledger indistinguishability,
2. transaction non-malleability, and
3. balance.
We briefly remind these notions. However, since our ambition is not to build a
new ledger, but a mixer that works on top of some existing blockchain we shall
define these properties in regard to a smart contract. Thus, in the following we
talk about (1) mixer indistinguishability, (2) mixer transaction non-malleability,
and (3) mixer balance. We briefly introduce these notions and debate about their
importance.
B.1 Mixer indistinguishability
This property ensures that a malicious user cannot acquire information, other
than publicly known data, from the smart contract. Looking at the protocol
presented in Section 3, public data could be, e.g., the account depositing money
in the mixer, the amount deposited, the account transferring funds via the mixer,
the account withdrawing funds along with the amount withdrawn. As mentioned,
all these pieces of information are publicly accessible because users need to pay
for the gas associated with the execution of these state transitions. Nevertheless,
using ZETH obfuscates the transaction graph, cf. Fig. 2, and pieces of information
such as the recipients or the amount of a given transaction are hidden.
As in [BCG+14], mixer indistinguishability is defined as a game between an
adversary A and a challenger C. The challenger initiates two mixers Mxr0 and
Mxr1 and tosses a coin b←$ {0, 1}. Then it sets Mxrleft = Mxrb and Mxrright =
Mxr1−b. A is given access to (Mxrleft, Mxrright) and is allowed to execute queries
on both mixers. After querying the mixers, A has to guess whether b = 0 or
b = 1.
28 We note that a similar approach was proposed independently in [BAZB19]
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Denote by ADDR a set of address key pairs, and by NOTE a set of zethNotes.
With this in mind, we present below the set of queries that can be submitted
by A to the challenger C29 (we describe each query with the associated steps
performed by the challenger):
Q = (CreateAddress)
– Compute addrpk, addrsk;
– ADDR ← ADDR ∪ {(addrpk, addrsk)} / Note that ADDR differs from Addr
since we also include addrsk in addition to addrpk;
– return addrpk.
Q = (Mix, {cmAddroldi }Ni=1, {vi}Mi=1, vin, vout, {addroldpk,i}Ni=1, {addrnewpk,i}Mi=1)
– Compute root rt over all note commitments in MTree;
– For i ∈ [1..N ]:
• let cmoldi be the commitment stored in address cmAddroldi in MTree,
• find a note zi in NOTE that opens commitment cmoldi ,
• find addroldpk,i in ADDR that is zi’s recipient address,
• compute a path mkPatholdi from cmoldi to rt
– For i ∈ [1..M ]:
• fetch from ADDR encryption key kpk,i for the party identified with
address addrnewpk,i,
• create new note znewi using anewpk,i from addrnewpk,i and vi,
• encrypt note znewi using kpk,i, i.e. compute ci = Enckpk,i(znewi ).
– Compute proof pi.
– Execute Mix(pi, rt, vin, vout, {cmnewi }Mi=1, {sni}Ni=1, {ci}Mi=1), abort if the func-
tion aborts.
– Add notes {znewi }Mi=1 to NOTE.
Q = (Receive, addrpk) / Tells the party that should receive money to update their
status.
– Run Receive on behalf of party P identified by addrpk.
– Let {zi}Ni=1 be a set of notes output by Receive in the previous step, then
NOTE← NOTE ∪ {zi}Ni=1.
– For {cmi}Ni=1 being commitments obtained by P corresponding to {zi}Ni=1,
output {cmi}Ni=1.
Q = (Insert, txMix) / Since the adversary can compute a transaction in their head
and simply execute it on Mxr.
– Execute Mix(txMix) and abort if it aborts.
– Run Receive for all addrpk in ADDR.
In order to play the game, the adversary submits the queries in pairs (Q,Q′).
If A’s query is Insert, then Q is executed on Mxrleft and query Q′ is executed on
Mxrright. In the case of other query types, C executes Q on Mxr0 and executes Q′
on Mxr1. Both queries have to be publicly consistent, i.e. be of the same type and
should share the public input30. For (a0, a1) being the output of the submitted
29 The queries structure comes from Zerocash with only minor modifications to make
them compatible with our mixer.
30 We refer the reader to [BCG+14] for a formal definition of publicly consistent queries.
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queries, C sends it back to A in the form of a tuple (ab, a1−b). At the end of the
game, A needs to guess the value b initially chosen by C.
It is worth noting that the set of queries described in the game above allows
A to modify the mixers’ internal storage via the execution of Mix that triggers
payments from some parties S to some other parties R (even though A does
not know the senders’ secret keys).
Mixer indistinguishability of ZETH follows directly from the ledger indistin-
guishability of Zerocash.
B.2 Transaction non-malleability
Transaction non-malleability assures that no adversary A can use a transaction
txMix to produce another transaction tx
∗
Mix that uses notes leading to the same
serial numbers and that is acceptable from a state that has been obtained by
a sequence of transitions that does not contain txMix (note that tx
∗
Mix cannot be
accepted by a smart contract which state has been obtained by the application
of txMix since the serial numbers revealed in txMix and tx
∗
Mix are the same). To
illustrate the importance of non-malleability we show a possible misuse of the
system if this property does not hold.
Assume that an adversary A has an overview of the whole Ethereum net-
work and observes a transaction txMix (note that Ethereum transactions do not
immediately reach all the network nodes. Propagating data, i.e. transactions,
blocks, to all the nodes takes some time). Let us denote by P the part of the
network on which A has seen the transaction txMix, and by P ′ its complement.
After observing txMix on P , A can generate another transaction tx∗Mix, related
to txMix, and disseminate it in P
′. If P ′ propagates faster, then tx∗Mix could be
accepted and txMix could be rejected. Denote by R, resp. R∗, the recipient of
funds in transaction txMix, resp. tx
∗
Mix. If the recipients are different and tx
∗
Mix
goes through, it means that A managed to steal funds intended for R by passing
them to R∗.
Non-malleability is defined by a game TR-NM, cf. Fig. 6. More concretely, we
say that a transaction scheme is non-malleable if for every NUPPT adversary A
and sufficiently large λ
Advtr-nmA,TR-NM(λ) ≤ negl(λ) .
Informally, we say that A wins the game if they manage to make a transfer trans-
action tx∗Mix, such that there exists another mix transaction txMix, that reveals
the same serial number as tx∗Mix, yet MixM′(tx
∗
Mix) does not abort. Here MixM′
represents the Mix function being executed on the mixer on state M′, i.e. the
state of the mixer before transaction txMix was accepted.
Intuitively, transaction non-malleability of our scheme comes directly from
the non-malleability of the underlying zkSNARK and IND-CCA2-security of
the encryption scheme. Recall the transaction syntax txMix = (pi, rt, vin, vout,
{cmnewi }Mi=1, {sni}Ni=1, {ci}Mi=1), where the first part, i.e. pi, rt, vin, vout, {cmnewi }Mi=1,
{sni}Ni=1, is a zero-knowledge proof and the statement it proves (call it proof
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TR-NM
1 : tx∗Mix ← AOL
2 : return ∃txMix ∈ Mxr : (txMix.sn = tx∗Mix.sn) ∧ (txMix 6= tx∗Mix) ∧ (MixM′(tx∗Mix) 6= ⊥)
Fig. 6: Transaction non-malleability game. Denote a serial number sn revealed
by transaction txMix by txMix.sn. The adversary A is given oracle access to ledger
L, where a smart contract Mxr is deployed. A wins if they manage to produce a
mixer transaction tx∗Mix such that there is another transaction txMix in Mxr that
has the same serial number but function MixM′ that also verifies transactions
does not abort, for a mixer state M′ just before txMix was included.
part), and the last tuple {ci}Mi=1 is an encryption of the transferred zethNotes
(call it ciphertext part). Now, if A were able to produce tx∗Mix different from txMix
but with the same serial numbers, then tx∗Mix and txMix would either differ on
their proof part or on their ciphertext part. First, note that A cannot change
any of the ciphertexts {ci}Mi=1 without changing the underlying plaintexts, since
IND-CCA2 holds. Likewise, any change in the plaintext changes the statement
for the zero-knowledge proof and requires to provide a new proof pi′. Since the
zkSNARK used is simulation-extractable, any adversary who provides proof pi
for an instance x, such that a pair (x, pi) has not been computed before, has to
know a corresponding witness w.
B.3 Balance
The balance property ensures that no adversary A can make money “out of thin
air”. To capture this intuition, [BCG+14] defines a game BAL in which A wins if
they own or spend more funds that they have either deposited or received from
other parties via Mxr. Following the notation in the above-mentioned games,
we say that a smart contract is balanced if for every PPT adversary A and
sufficiently large λ
AdvbalA,BAL(λ) ≤ negl(λ) .
At first a mixer Mxr is set up by a challenger C and A is given oracle access
to it. A is free to issue queries to Mxr as in Appendix B.1. At the end of the
game, A sends C a set of notes {zi}i∈I , for some set I. Challenger C computes
the following quantities:
• vunspent: the total value of spendable notes in {zi}i∈I . We call a note z spend-
able if it is feasible to create a transaction txMix such that txMix uses z’s data
as input and is acceptable by Mxr.
• vpublicIn: the total value of public input vin in transactions submitted by A.
• vpublicOut: the total value of public output vout in transactions submitted by A.
• vinc: value of all notes transferred to A from addresses in ADDR.
• vexp: value of all notes transferred from A to addresses in ADDR.
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Note that all values can be computed by C by observing A’s queries to Mxr. We
say that A wins the game BAL iff
vunspent + vpublicOut + vexp > vpublicIn + vinc .
The proof of balance property follows the proof given in Zerocash. However, we
note that PRFaddr needs to be collision resistant to fix the omission in Zerocash
security proof, as mentioned in [HBHW19, Section 8.8].
